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EXTRA! EXTRA!: PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS
JEOPARDIZES CREDIT BIDDING
INTRODUCTION
Secured creditors have generally enjoyed the opportunity to credit bid at
the public auction of their collateral during bankruptcy proceedings. Recently,
however, the Third and Fifth Circuits have authorized unprecedented
cramdown plans that allow sales of collateral free and clear of liens to be
authorized under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 Consequently,
they have permitted secured creditors’ once powerful credit bidding rights,
granted in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), to be circumvented.
A. Facts of In re Philadelphia Newspapers
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, the former owner and operator of several
Philadelphia print and online publications, including the Philadelphia Inquirer,
Philadelphia Daily News, and Philly.com, filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition
in February 2009.2 At the time of filing, the debtor owed its senior lenders
$295 million, a value that increased to $318 million during the course of the
bankruptcy proceedings.3 The senior lenders held first priority liens on
substantially all of the debtor’s real and personal property.4 In June 2009, PMH
Holdings, LLC, Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC’s parent company, also filed a
voluntary chapter 11 petition.5
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC and PMH Holdings, LLC proposed a plan
of reorganization in August 2009 that contemplated selling substantially all of
their assets free and clear of all liens and surrendering their headquarters
building.6 The debtors also entered into an asset purchase agreement with a
stalking horse bidder, composed of some of the debtors’ prepetition equity

1

11 U.S.C. § 1129(B)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2009); see also In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’g
418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
3 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 301–02.
2
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holders.7 Under the debtors’ proposed plan, following a successful stalking
horse bid, the senior lenders would only receive approximately $36 million of
their $295 million claim.8 Surprisingly, as the Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted, these facts and circumstances are
mundane:
To this extent the circumstances presented are unremarkable.
Indeed, it has become increasingly common for [c]hapter 11
debtors to proceed in precisely the fashion the instant Debtors do.
Often such proceedings are consensual. The present cases are
distinguishable, however, in the degree of animosity that exists
between the Debtors and their creditors. It is, regrettably, quite
high.9
Pursuant to their plan, the debtors filed a motion for approval of their
proposed bid procedures10 that would preclude secured lenders from “credit
bidding”11 at the public auction. It did this by requiring all bidders to fund their
purchases with cash.12 To justify this result, the debtors suggested a reading of
the Bankruptcy Code that circumvented the secured creditors’ express right to
credit bid articulated in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). The debtors proposed that the
three provisions in § 1129(b)(2)(A) should be interpreted as disjunctive
alternatives. Accordingly, the sale of the secured creditors’ collateral could be
7 Id. at 301. A “stalking horse bidder” is “a prospective buyer who commits to an initial [minimum] bid”
at a chapter 11 asset sale. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[7] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2011). The stalking horse bidder for this public auction included insiders who owned a substantial
share in PMH Holdings, LLC. See In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301.
8 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 554 (E.D. Pa. 2009), rev’g No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL
3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009), aff’d, 599 F.3d 298.
9 In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *1, rev’d, 418 B.R. 548, aff’d, 599 F.3d 298.
10 See Debtors’ Motion for an Order: (A) Approving Procedures for the Sale of Certain of the Debtors’
Assets; (B) Scheduling an Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and Assignment Procedures; (D) Approving
Form of Notice; and (E) Granting Related Relief at 9, 15–18, In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR,
2009 WL 3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Debtors’ Motion for an Order Approving Sale
Procedures].
11 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302 n.4 (“A credit bid allows a secured lender to bid its debt in
lieu of cash.”); see also infra pp. 15–16.
12 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302. The debtors’ motion expressly sought to prohibit credit
bidding:

Credit Bid: The Plan Sale is being conducted under [§§] 1123(a) and (b) and 1129 of the
Bankruptcy Code, and not [§] 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. As such, no holder of a lien on any
assets of the Debtors shall be permitted to credit bid pursuant to [§] 363(k) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Debtors’ Motion for an Order Approving Sale Procedures, supra note 10, at 9; see also In re Phila.
Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *2.
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crammed down under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) as an alternative to
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), as long as the § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) requirement that
creditors receive the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of their collateral
was satisfied.13
The secured lenders objected to the proposed bid procedures, arguing that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted to protect secured creditors’ absolute right
to credit bid.14 The bankruptcy court agreed with the secured lenders and
denied the debtors’ motion for approval of the bid procedures.15 The
bankruptcy court “reasoned that while the Plan proceeded under the
‘indubitable equivalent’ prong of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), it was structured as a
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) plan sale in every respect other than credit bidding,” and
the court “determined that any sale of the Debtors’ assets required that a
secured lender be able to participate in a sale by credit bidding its debt.”16
Thus, under the bankruptcy court’s opinion, the lenders would be permitted to
credit bid up to $318 million at the auction sale of their collateral, receiving
more value than they would otherwise under the debtors’ proposed bidding
procedures.
On appeal, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
reversed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, thereby precluding the secured lenders

13

In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *3. As the bankruptcy court summarized,
The Debtors maintain that the language of the Bankruptcy Code sections they point to is clear,
and that the same unambiguously confirms . . . that even if § 363 applies in the instance where
cramdown confirmation of a reorganization plan is sought under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), it
is still inapplicable to the instant facts, because the Debtors do not intend to request confirmation
of their Plan under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), but instead intend to demonstrate that their plan provides
the Lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their claims, thus independently entitling their
Plan to confirmation under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).

Id.
14 Objection of the Steering Group of Prepetition Secured Lenders and Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, as
Agent for the Prepetition Secured Lenders, to Debtors’ Motion for an Order: (A) Approving Procedures for the
Sale of Certain of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling an Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and
Assignment Procedures; (D) Approving Form of Notice; and (E) Granting Related Relief at 10, In re Phila.
Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2009); see also In re Phila.
Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *4; Joinder of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the
Objection of the Steering Group of Prepetition Secured Lenders and Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, as Agent
for the Prepetition Secured Lenders, to Debtors’ Motion for an Order: (A) Approving Procedures for the Sale
of Certain of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling an Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and Assignment
Procedures; (D) Approving Form of Notice; and (E) Granting Related Relief at 1–2, In re Phila. Newspapers,
LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009).
15 In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 WL 3242292, at *11.
16 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302.
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from credit bidding.17 The district court found that the plain meaning of the
statute “provides three distinct alternative arrangements for satisfaction of plan
confirmation in the context of cramdown of a dissenting class of secured
creditors and that the Debtors may select any of these to proceed to
confirmation.”18 The Third Circuit later affirmed the district court’s reversal of
the bankruptcy court,19 but not without an extensive and spirited dissent by
Judge Ambro.20 Other critics of the majority’s decision were quick to express
their surprise and disapproval. Ralph Brubaker, a noted bankruptcy scholar,
disparaged the “surprise ‘discovery’ of this unprecedented cramdown power
over 30 years after enactment of § 1129(b).”21 He criticized the district court’s
“plain meaning” theory and commented that the majority’s reading of the
statute “had evidently escaped everyone for over 30 years.”22
Because of the Third Circuit’s unprecedented decision in In re Philadelphia
Newspapers, the secured creditors resorted to an alternative solution. Having
been denied the opportunity to credit bid,23 the secured lenders faced the
plausible outcome that their collateral might only receive the low stalking
horse bid.24 Fearing excessive undervaluation,25 the senior lenders submitted a
cash bid and prevailed at the public auction after bidding against a local
philanthropist.26 Their winning cash bid was $105 million, almost $70 million
higher than the original stalking horse bid.27
17

In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 552 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 599 F.3d 298.
Id. at 567.
19 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 318.
20 Id. at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
21 Ralph Brubaker, Cramdown of an Undersecured Creditor Through Sale of the Creditor’s Collateral:
Herein of Indubitable Equivalence, the § 1111(b)(2) Election, Sub Rosa Sales, Credit Bidding, and Disposition
of Sale Proceeds, 29 BANKR. L. LETTER, Dec. 2009, at 1, 7.
22 Id.
23 Order (A) Approving Second Amended Procedures for the Sale of Certain of the Debtors’ Assets; (B)
Scheduling an Auction; (C) Approving Form of Asset Purchase Agreement; (D) Approving Assumption &
Assignment Procedures; (E) Approving Form of Notice; & (F) Granting Related Relief at add. 1(f), In re Phila.
Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2010) (“Credit Bid: The
Senior Agent, one or more of the Prepetition Secured Lenders, and any Newco created by any of the
Prepetition Secured Lenders (including PN Purchaser Co, LLC) shall not have the right to credit bid at the
Second Auction and any credit bid submitted shall not be a Qualified Bid for any purposes whatsoever.”).
24 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8,
2009).
25 The stalking horse bid would only generate $36 million despite the $318 million owed to the secured
lenders. Id. at *2; see also supra text accompanying note 3.
26 Joseph A. Slobodzian, Senior Lenders Win 2d Auction for Phila. Papers, PHILLY.COM, Sept. 23, 2010,
http://articles.philly.com/2010-09-23/news/24980119_1_philadelphia-papers-senior-lenders-bruce-toll.
27 Order Confirming Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan as of Sept. 24, 2010 at 20, In re Phila.
Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010).
18
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This result was a major blow to the secured lenders, as they had to pool
together over $100 million to fund their cash bid. However, the secured lenders
still fared considerably well for creditors in their circumstances. The
bankruptcy court confirmed the sale and the debtors’ plan on September 30,
2010;28 the lenders took ownership of the Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia
Daily News, and Philly.com on October 8, 2010.29
B. An Absolute Right to Credit Bid?
The Third Circuit represents one side of a split in the courts as to whether a
secured creditor has an almost absolute right to credit bid on the sale of its
collateral under § 1129(b)(2)(A). While all courts agree that § 363(k) provides
a single exception to credit bidding rights when “the court for cause orders
otherwise,”30 only a few courts have proposed that secured creditors have an
absolute right to credit bid.31
Other courts, as demonstrated by the Third Circuit in Philadelphia
Newspapers,32 reject the notion that secured creditors have an almost absolute
right to credit bid. The Fifth Circuit, hearing In re Pacific Lumber on appeal,
also denied secured lenders the opportunity to credit bid.33 Under the proposed
reorganization plan in Pacific Lumber, the secured creditors’ collateral would
be sold without providing the secured creditors a right to credit bid.34 The
secured creditors challenged the plan under § 1129(b)(2)(A), claiming that the
plan was not “fair and equitable” under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) because the
secured creditors’ collateral was sold free and clear of liens, without the
28

Id. at 22.
Christopher K. Hepp, New Owners Take Control of Inquirer, Daily News, and Philly.com, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Oct. 9, 2010, at A01.
30 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006).
31 In 1994, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that creditors have the
“unconditional right” to credit bid under § 1129(b)(2)(A). In re Kent Terminal Corp., 166 B.R. 555, 566–67
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“If a plan proposes the sale of a creditor’s collateral free and clear of liens, the
lienholder has the unconditional right to bid in its lien.”). The following year, in 1995, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also implied that creditors have an almost absolute right to credit bid. In re
River Vill. Assocs., 181 B.R. 795, 805 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“Congress did not intend to deprive creditors of the
right to bid their full claim under a reorganization plan.”). Most recently, the Seventh Circuit concurred with
the idea of a creditor’s near absolute right to credit bid. See River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), No. 10-3597, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131 (7th Cir. June 28,
2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2011) (No. 11-166).
32 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
33 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2009).
34 Id. at 239.
29
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creditors being provided an opportunity to credit bid.35 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the secured creditors’ claim that they had a right to credit bid
at the auction, reading § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) to offer a “distinct basis” for
confirming the plan as an alternative to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).36 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the sale could instead occur under the “indubitable equivalent”
standard provided in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), thereby circumventing the credit
bidding clause of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).37 However, the authorization of such a
plan was unprecedented, even though these cramdown provisions had been in
effect for over thirty years.38
Although Judge Ambro wrote a well-written, lengthy dissent in
Philadelphia Newspapers,39 the Seventh Circuit is the only appellate court to
deviate from the Third and Fifth Circuits’ interpretations. In In re River Road,
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a motion to
approve bid procedures factually similar to those in Philadelphia Newspapers
and succinctly opined:
The majority in Philadelphia Newspapers approved the Debtors’
proposed interpretation of [§] 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). This court,
however, finds Judge Ambro’s well-reasoned dissent in Philadelphia
Newspapers more persuasive. The Debtors, therefore, may not use [§]
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) to sell their assets free and clear of liens. The
Debtors must comply with the specific requirements of [§]
40
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).

35

Id.
Id. at 245.
37 Id. at 245–46.
38 Before 2009, only two bankruptcy courts had suggested that a plan might be approved under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) as offering the indubitable equivalent, even though it could not be approved under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). In re Criimi Mae, Inc., 251 B.R. 796, 807 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (“[B]ecause of the
disjunctive construction of [§] 1129(b)(2)(A), if debtors can meet the test of indubitable equivalence, the plan
can be confirmed without compliance with subsection (ii).”); In re Martindale, 125 B.R. 32, 37–38 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1991) (denying confirmation and suggesting that a plan that does not permit credit bidding cannot be
approved under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), but might be approved under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) as providing the
indubitable equivalent). Neither of these opinions actually confirmed a plan that denied the creditors a right to
credit bid. The Fifth Circuit itself conceded that its Pacific Lumber decision to allow a sale under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) was without precedent: “The nature of this cramdown and the refusal to apply
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) to authorize a credit bid are unusual, perhaps unprecedented decisions.” In re Pac. Lumber,
584 F.3d at 243.
39 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 319–38 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
40 Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion at 3, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, No.
09B30029, 2010 WL 6634603 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010).
36
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s opinion on direct
appeal.41 In a compelling opinion that finally ripens the issue for Supreme
Court review, the Seventh Circuit, in River Road, found “that the Code
requires that cramdown plans that contemplate selling encumbered assets free
and clear of liens at an auction satisfy the requirements set forth in Subsection
(ii) of the statute.”42
In other circuits, the dispute over the right to credit bid remains
hazardously undecided. For now, secured lenders must prepare for the
possibility of a blow from other courts. Consequently, these lenders should aim
to protect their right to collect the full value of their collateral by adopting
prophylactic strategies.
There are two plausible readings of § 1129(b)(2)(A), each of which
drastically affects the allocation of risk between secured creditors and their
debtors. Under the first construction, the statute can be read to present three
disjunctive alternatives, any of which may satisfy the “fair and equivalent”
standard test. The district court and the Third Circuit in Philadelphia
Newspapers applied the disjunctive reading,43 which was previously used by
only the Fifth Circuit.44 The second construction was first championed by the
bankruptcy court45 and Judge Ambro’s dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers46
and later followed by Judge Black47 and the Seventh Circuit in River Road.48
Under this second construction, the statute can be read to offer two alternatives
and a third catch-all that addresses situations that the first two alternatives do
not plainly cover. The two specific alternatives are compartmentalized because
the facts and circumstances dictate which of the two alternatives should be
used. The catch-all provision applies only if neither alternative pertains to the
41 River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), No. 103597, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *2 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112
(U.S. Aug. 5, 2011) (No. 11-166).
42 Id. at *32.
43 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305; In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 567 (E.D. Pa.
2009), aff’d, 599 F.3d 298.
44 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2009).
45 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 WL 3242292, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8,
2009).
46 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 326–27 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
47 Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion at 3, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, No.
09B30029, 2010 WL 6634603 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010).
48 River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), No. 103597, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *32 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112
(U.S. Aug. 5, 2011) (No. 11-166).
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instant situation. The Third Circuit summarized this catch-all reading as
follows:
[A]ny [c]hapter 11 plan proposing the transfer of assets encumbered
by their original liens must proceed under subsection (i), any plan
proposing the free and clear sale of assets must proceed under
subsection (ii), and only those plans proposing a disposition not
covered by subsections (i) and (ii), most notably the substitution of
49
collateral, may then proceed under subsection (iii).

The application of these two constructions demonstrates that there is no single
“plain meaning” of the statute. Although the statute is vague, an analysis using
the statute’s legislative history, the canons of statutory interpretation, and the
Code drafters’ commentary reveals that Congress enacted § 1129(b)(2)(A) to
prohibit sales of collateral free of liens when lien holders are not permitted to
credit bid on their collateral.
This Comment supports the plausible catch-all reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A)
ignored by the majorities in Philadelphia Newspapers and Pacific Lumber.
First, this Comment will analyze how these majorities erred by only
considering one of several plausible readings of § 1129(b)(2)(A). One
interpretation, herein called the “disjunctive reading,” holds that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) provides three disjunctive alternatives, such that any of the
treatments will independently satisfy the “fair and equitable” requirement.
Another interpretation, herein called the “catch-all reading,” proposes that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) provides two specific approaches and a third catch-all
approach which is applied only if the facts and circumstances are not covered
by the prior two approaches. Although both interpretations purport to arise
from a plain meaning interpretation of the statute, this Comment argues that
the Third and Fifth Circuits erred because they only acknowledged the
disjunctive reading of the statute. Second, this Comment will examine the
strengths and weaknesses of each interpretation, consider statutory intent and
policy implications, and conclude that the circuit courts in Philadelphia
Newspapers and Pacific Lumber erred in holding that a secured creditor does
not have an absolute right to credit bid on its collateral. Finally, in anticipation
of future setbacks from other courts, this Comment will suggest both
preemptive and reactive strategies that creditors can implement to best protect
their rights to the full value of their secured collateral, thus mitigating the blow
dealt by the Third and Fifth Circuits.
49

In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 306 (emphasis added).
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C. Background Legal Doctrines
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides a test for court confirmation
of a chapter 11 plan involving dissenting secured claims.50 As codified in
§ 1129(b)(1), a plan must be confirmed if it “does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”51
Courts must determine what is “fair and equitable” when confirming a
chapter 11 nonconsensual plan. Congress assisted bankruptcy courts in making
their determinations by providing an extensive list of requirements to
demonstrate what is “fair and equitable.”52 “Most courts determine compliance
with the fair and equitable requirement” by using the list in § 1129(b)(2).53
The list of requirements includes a provision specifically regarding
“secured creditor cramdown,” which is delineated in § 1129(b)(2)(A).54 The
provision applies exclusively to one class of creditors—secured, dissenting
creditors55—and guarantees payment in full of the secured claim.56 It also
provides three ways for a cramdown to occur:
The three alternatives to effectuate cramdown on secured creditors
under § 1129(b)(2)(A) are: (i) retention of liens and receipt of
payments equal to the value of the creditor’s interest in property
of the estate; (ii) liens on the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral and receipt of payment equal to the value of such

50 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2637 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(1) (2006)).
51 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006); see also 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don
Edwards) (“Paragraph (1) makes clear that this alternative confirmation standard, referred to as ‘cram down,’
will be called into play only on the request of the proponent of the plan. Under this cram down test, the court
must confirm the plan if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is ‘fair and equitable,’ with respect to
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan. The requirement of the
House bill that a plan not ‘discriminate unfairly’ with respect to a class is included for clarity; the language in
the House report interpreting that requirement, in the context of subordinated debentures, applies equally under
the requirements of [§] 1129(b)(1) of the House amendment.”).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2); 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards)
(“Paragraph (2) provides guidelines for a court to determine whether a plan is fair and equitable with respect to
a dissenting class.”).
53 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[1].
54 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
55 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (“Subparagraph (A) applies when a
class of secured claims is impaired and has not accepted the plan.”).
56 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2].
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proceeds; or (iii) realization by the holders of secured claims of
the “indubitable equivalent” of their claims.57
The first approach, codified in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), permits a court to
confirm a plan if it provides:
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in
58
such property . . . .

When plans are confirmed under this provision, secured creditors do not
release their liens on their collateral. Instead, the liens remain attached to their
corresponding collateral, even if the collateral is transferred under the plan.59
This subsection requires that the secured creditor receive cash payments
bearing interest at the rate deemed appropriate by the court.60
The second approach, delineated in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), expressly provides
an illustration for the sale of collateral of a secured creditor. This provision
permits a court to confirm a plan if it provides:
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such
liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the
treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
61
subparagraph . . . .

The sale of collateral of a secured creditor is expressly governed by § 363(k),
effectively granting secured creditors whose collateral is sold under this
provision the right to credit bid, or purchase their collateral by offsetting their
claim against the purchase price. Section 363(k) reads:

57

6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D
§ 113:11, at 113-27 (2008).
58 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)(A)(i).
59 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2][a] (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)).
60 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
61 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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(k) At a sale [other than in the ordinary course of business] of
property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless
the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid
at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property,
such holder may offset such claim against the purchase price of such
62
property.

This illustration in § 363(k) allows secured creditors to bid at the sale of their
collateral up to the full amount of their claims without cash.63 The creditor is
able to offset up to the full value of its claim, even if the creditor was
previously deemed undersecured.64 For example, if a creditor has a $200
million claim, but the value of its secured claim is only $50 million, it can still
bid any amount up to $200 million. This is particularly useful to creditors
when the value of the collateral is greater than the value of the secured portion
of its claim. Furthermore, if the creditor has the highest bid, the creditor “may
offset its claim against the purchase price of the property.”65 Thus, the creditor
can often purchase its own collateral “without having to part with new
funds.”66
The credit bidding mechanism delineated in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is useful to
secured creditors because it grants them “an effective veto over a low sales
price.”67 The purpose of credit bidding is to ensure that the market properly
values the creditor’s collateral.68 Credit bidding allows secured creditors to
trump other bids that are lower than the value of the property, thus ensuring
that an auction yields a fair and equivalent price.69 When an auction sale does
not appear to be yielding a fair price, the credit bidding mechanism allows a
62

Id. § 363(k).
3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 363.09.
64 Id.; see also Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 459 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“It is well settled among district and bankruptcy courts that creditors can bid the full face value of
their secured claims under § 363(k).”).
65 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 363.09; see also Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute
Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (1991) (“[T]he Code does recognize the
possibility of a debtor taking advantage of a low valuation and offers protection to that creditor through the
vehicle of a credit bidding. Thus, if such creditors believe that the sale price is too low, they may credit bid
their claim at a higher amount, and purchase the property.”).
66 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 363.09.
67 6 NORTON, supra note 57, § 113:17, at 113–43; see also 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2][b][ii]
(“This gives the secured creditor protections against attempts to sell the collateral too cheaply; if the secured
party thinks the collateral is worth more than the debtor is selling it for, it may effectively bid its debt and take
title to the property.”).
68 See In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 460.
69 Alan M. Christenfeld & Barbara M. Goodstein, Rulings Pose Questions About Right to Credit Bid, 243
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4, 2010 (Corporate Update).
63
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secured creditor to bid up the price until it is fair.70 Secured creditors need not
successfully outbid other potential buyers to reap the benefit of credit bidding,
as they already receive the proceeds of the sale.
In practice, a secured creditors’ claim treated pursuant to
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) also undergoes treatment under either § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) or
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). The approach provided for in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) merely
converts secured property into cash collateral.71 Then, the liens on the cash
collateral created by the sale receive treatment under clause (i) or clause (iii).72
The third and final approach, found in § 1129(b)(1)(A)(iii), permits a court
to confirm a plan that provides: “for the realization by such holders of the
indubitable equivalent of such claims.”73 This alternative “was designed to
cover those plan proposals that are not included in the two preceding
sections.”74 The Congressional Report for the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
provides some direction on what meets the standard for “indubitable
equivalence”: “Abandonment of the collateral to the creditor would clearly
satisfy indubitable equivalence, as would a lien on similar collateral.”75 The
Congressional Report leaves no indication that a sale of collateral free and
clear of liens might be confirmed under the indubitable equivalent approach.76
Undoubtedly, a “plan may be crammed down notwithstanding the dissent
of a secured class only if the plan complies with clause (i), (ii), or (iii).”77
However, the relationship between the three clauses remains unclear. Can a
plan proponent unilaterally choose to sell a secured creditor’s collateral subject
to subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) instead of subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)?
The recent Third and Fifth Circuit decisions answered this with a
resounding “yes”—a plan proponent can use clause (iii) to circumvent clause

70 Michael E. Rubinger & Gary W. Marsh, “Sale of Collateral” Plans Which Deny a Nonrecourse
Undersercured Creditor the Right to Credit Bid: Pine Gate Revisited, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 265, 273 (1994).
71 Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1495, 1531 (1993). (“Thus the sale of the collateral under clause (ii) is simply a means of converting
secured property of the estate into cash collateral, which then implicates either clause (i) or clause (iii).”).
72 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (dictating “the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause
(i) or (iii) of this subparagraph.”); see also Friedman, supra note 71, at 1531.
73 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
74 6 NORTON, supra note 57, § 113:18, at 113–43.
75 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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(ii).78 In agreement, Collier on Bankruptcy suggests, “Section 1129(b)(2)(A)
lists three possible treatments of a secured claim; any one of them will
independently satisfy the fair and equitable requirement.”79 Additionally,
Collier on Bankruptcy recently stated,
A plan providing for the sale of assets free and clear of a security
interest may be confirmed if it provides the secured creditor with the
realization of the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), even though the plan deprives the secured
creditor of the right to credit bid under §§ 363(k) and
80
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Currently, the Third and Fifth Circuit stand alone in allowing debtors to
circumvent clause (ii). Others have cogently argued that a debtor cannot avoid
the requirement that a plan cramming down a sale free and clear of liens be
subject to § 363(k). In addition to Judge Ambro’s persuasive dissent in
Philadelphia Newspapers and the compelling Seventh Circuit opinion in River
Road,81 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice suggests that § 1129(b)(2)(A)
was not designed to allow a plan proponent to avoid the credit bidding
requirement in clause (ii).82 This view proposes that the indubitable equivalent
clause is merely a catch-all instead of an alternative and thus cannot be used to

78 See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 318 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v.
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009) (“This court
has subscribed to the obvious proposition that because the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by
the disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives.”).
79 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2] (“The plan proponent may seek to satisfy the claim in full by
giving the creditor a note in the amount of the secured claim secured by the same collateral. The plan
proponent may also seek to sell the collateral free of the lien, and transfer the lien to the proceeds of sale.
Finally, the proponent may seek to give the creditor the ‘indubitable equivalent’ of its claim.”); see also Wade
v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 1994) (proponent need not provide indubitable equivalent if any of
other two clauses of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are met)).
80 1 COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION 942 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2010) (citing In re
Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 298); accord In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 229.
81 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 326 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“Although the language of clause
(iii) is broad . . . it is a ‘catch-all’ not designed to supplant clauses (i) and (ii) where they plainly apply.”);
River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), No. 10-3597,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *2 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011) (“The infinitely more plausible interpretation of
[§] 1129(b)(2)(A) would read each subsection as stating the requirements for a particular type of sale and
‘construing each of the [] subparagraphs . . . [as conclusively governing] the category of proceedings it
addresses.’ Under such a reading, plans could only qualify as ‘fair and equitable’ under Subsection (iii) if they
proposed disposing of assets in ways that are not described in Subsections (i) and (ii).” (omissions and
insertions in original)), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2011) (No. 11-166).
82 6 NORTON, supra note 57, § 113:18, at 113–44. (“The provision was designed to cover those plan
proposals that are not included in the two proceeding sections.”).
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authorize a debtor to cram down a plan that sells secured lenders’ assets free
and clear of liens and denies them the right to credit bid.
D. Interpreting § 1129(b)(2)(A)
The emerging circuit split reveals a division as to the true plain meaning of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). The weakness of the interpretation by the majorities in
Philadelphia Newspapers and Pacific Lumber is that it did not consider other
language in § 1129(b)(2)(A) that calls into question whether there is a single
“plain meaning” of the statute. The language is ambiguous. Interpretation of an
ambiguous statute requires consideration of other material such as legislative
history, but the majorities’ fixation on “plain meaning” precluded such
consideration. This resulted in incomplete statutory analysis. Ignoring
legislative history led the Third and Fifth Circuits to an unprecedented and
unpopular result.
1. Plain Meaning Analysis Reveals No Single Plain Meaning of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)
Applying the principles of statutory interpretation reveals that
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) is ambiguous, and thus, the Third and Fifth Circuit’s “plain
meaning” analysis was insufficient to interpret the statute. Statutory
interpretation first considers the plain meaning of the statute, examining the
common meaning of the statute’s language. The Supreme Court instructed that
courts should apply a literal interpretation of a statute unless it is
unambiguous.83 A provision is “ambiguous” if it is “reasonably susceptible of
different interpretations.”84 Therefore, for a provision to be unambiguous—and
thus, for consideration of the statute’s plain language meaning to be a
sufficient analysis—the statute cannot be reasonably susceptible to different
interpretations. The majorities in Philadelphia Newspapers and Pacific Lumber
erroneously concluded that the plain meaning of § 1129(b)(2)(A) is

83 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” (quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))), cited in In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 304; see also Andersson v.
Sec. Fed. Sav. & Loan of Cleveland (In re Andersson), 209 B.R. 76, 78 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997) (“[S]tatutory
interpretation is a holistic endeavor which must begin with the language of the statute itself. Resort to an
examination of legislative history is appropriate only to resolve statutory ambiguity, and in the final analysis,
such examination must not produce a result demonstratively at odds with the purpose of the legislation.”).
84 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985).
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unambiguous, and they consequently failed to consider other axioms of
statutory interpretation.
a. Erroneously Recognizing Only One of Two Plausible Readings
The circuit courts in Philadelphia Newspapers and Pacific Lumber erred in
concluding that the plain meaning of § 1129(b)(2)(A) is unambiguous. The
statute is, rather, open to two plausible interpretations. As Judge Ambro’s
dissent identifies, the mere fact that the lower courts in Philadelphia
Newspapers came to opposite conclusions on the “plain meaning” of the
statute indicates “that the provision is ambiguous when read in isolation and
does not have a single plain meaning.”85 Although “§ 1129(b)(2)(A) is phrased
in the disjunctive,”86 courts and lenders had never interpreted the statute to
grant three distinct alternatives. Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, lenders have interpreted the statute to provide an absolute right to credit
bid in the sale of their collateral under a cramdown.
b. Considering the Plain Meaning of Some, but Not All Language
The majorities also erred in holding that the language was unambiguous
because they improperly limited their analysis to some, but not all, of the
language contained in § 1129(b)(2)(A). A proper reading of the statute must
consider other statutory language.
i. Exclusive vs. Non-exclusive “Or”
The Third and Fifth Circuits incorrectly assumed that the “or” in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) is non-exclusive. In Pacific Lumber, the Fifth Circuit
interpreted the use of “or” between the clauses of subsections 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)
and (iii) to mean that the clauses must be disjunctive alternatives.87 In
Philadelphia Newspapers, the majority also limited its analysis to the “use of
the word ‘or’” to separate the three clauses.88 The majority pointed to the
Bankruptcy Code’s rules of construction provided in § 102, where the Code

85

In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 322 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Id. at 305 (majority opinion) (“The Lenders concede, as they must, that § 1129(b)(2)(A) is phrased in
the disjunctive. The use of the word ‘or’ in this provision operates to provide alternatives—a debtor may
proceed under subsection (i), (ii), or (iii), and need not satisfy more than one subsection.”).
87 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009).
88 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305.
86
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instructs that “‘or’ is not exclusive.”89 The majority in Philadelphia
Newspapers noted that “courts have followed this uncontroversial mandate,”
and it cited several cases that did in fact hold that the “or” in § 1129(b)(2)(A)
gives debtors a unilateral choice between three options.90
However, because courts do not always interpret “or” as non-exclusive, the
courts should have looked further than the word’s presence to determine its
meaning.91 Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that such a “non-exclusive” reading
is permissible only “if context and practicality allow.”92 Sometimes, context
and practicality do not allow the court to interpret “or” as non-exclusive.
Illuminating this exception, Judge Ambro’s dissent included an impressive list
of examples in the Bankruptcy Code in which “or” is interpreted as exclusive
instead of disjunctive.93
Here in § 1129(b)(2)(A), context and practicality urge the reading of “or”
as exclusive. Clause (ii) presents a practical approach that must be followed in
the context of selling collateral for the sale to meet the “fair and equitable
treatment” requirement. First, when collateral is sold, the sale is subject to
§ 363(k), and a secured creditor’s “liens . . . attach to the proceeds of such
sale.”94 In practice, clause (ii) converts secured property into cash collateral.95
After conversion, the liens on the cash collateral created by the sale receive

89

See 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (2006); In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 315 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6272; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 28 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5814) (“The statutory note to § 102(5) further explains that ‘if a party “may do (a) or
(b)”, then the party may do either or both. The party is not limited to a mutually exclusive choice between the
two alternatives.’”).
90 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305–06; see, e.g., In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245 (citing two
cases from the Fifth Circuit and one each from the Tenth Circuit and Eastern District of Pennsylvania that
affirm the disjunctive nature of § 1129(b)(2)(A)).
91 River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), No. 103597, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *21 n.5 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011) (“[T]he mere presence of the term ‘or’
is insufficient to resolve this issue.”), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2011) (No. 11166).
92 2 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 102.06 n.1 (using § 1112(b) as an example where “[i]t would be impossible
for the court to do both”), quoted in In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 324 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
93 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 324 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“Numerous sections of the
Bankruptcy Code employ the disjunctive ‘or’ in a context where the alternative options render the ‘or’
exclusive. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §[§] 365(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (assumption of executory contract before or after
conversion), 506(d)(1)–(2) (voiding liens for disallowed claims for one of two reasons), 1112(b)(1)
(conversion or dismissal of a chapter 11 case), 1325(a)(5)(B)–(C) (requirements for confirmation of a chapter
13 plan), 1325(b)(3)(A)–(C) (means test categories), 1325(b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii) (same).”).
94 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
95 Friedman, supra note 71, at 1531.
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treatment under clause (i) or clause (iii).96 The two-step procedure for fair and
equitable treatment of sales suggests that the “or” separating clauses (i), (ii),
and (iii) is not disjunctive because the treatment in clause (i) and clause (iii)
are incorporated into the second step of clause (ii)’s two-step procedure. For
example, under clause (ii)’s fair and equitable treatment, a debtor sells a
secured creditor’s collateral under the first step of clause (ii), providing
§ 363(k) credit bidding rights; then, after the secured creditor’s lien attaches to
the proceeds from the sale, the debtor must proceed under either clause (i) or
clause (iii). Thus, after the sale, the liens can remain on the proceeds only if the
secured creditor receives interest payments pursuant to clause (i). In the
alternative, the proceeds will be abandoned to the secured creditor, providing
the “indubitable equivalent” of the claim pursuant to clause (iii). Clause (ii)’s
incorporation of the two other clauses in the later step suggests that a debtor
cannot jump to the later step, circumventing the first step that promises credit
bidding rights. This refutes the proposition that clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) could
serve as three disjunctive alternatives.
ii. “Includes” vs. “Provides”: Reading the Plain Meaning of the Wrong
Language
The Third and Fifth Circuits misread the operative word in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A), causing them to interpret the plain meaning of the wrong
language. The misapplication of the plain meaning theory to the wrong word in
this instance disguised the considerable ambiguity that otherwise exists in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). Closely examining the correct operative word reveals that
two reasonable interpretations exist, one of which was wholly dismissed by the
Fifth Circuit because of its improper application of the plain meaning theory to
the wrong language.
The majorities applied the verb “includes,” from § 1129(b)(2), in place of
the operative verb “provides,” in § 1129(b)(2)(A).97 Section 1129(b)(2) reads,
“For the purposes of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements: (A) With
respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides – (i) . . . ; (ii) . . . ; or
(iii) . . . .”98
96 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“[T]he treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of
this subparagraph . . .”); see also Friedman, supra note 71, at 1531.
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2), (b)(2)(A); see, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured
Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 245 (5th Cir. 2009).
98 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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The Fifth Circuit focused on the word “includes” to suggest that the three
clauses were non-exhaustive.99 The Code’s rules of construction, codified in
§ 102, state, “‘[I]ncludes’ and ‘including’ are not limiting . . . .”100 Applying
“includes” as the operative word of the sentence, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
three alternatives were “not even exhaustive.”101 Thus, because other
alternatives were feasible yet were left out by the statute, the Court found that
the three stated alternatives could not be treated as if each alternative only
applied in a specific situation, i.e., “compartmentalized alternatives.”102
Although the Fifth Circuit correctly applied the meaning of “include” as
defined in § 102, “includes” is not the operative word controlling the three
provisions. Instead, “provides” is the verb that immediately precedes them.103
“Includes” broadly relates to both plans cramming down secured and
unsecured creditors, whereas “provides” only circumscribes plans cramming
down secured creditors. As Judge Ambro noted in his dissent, “[O]nce we
delve into (b)(2)(A), we are solely concerned with the treatment of a class of
secured claims, and the relevant verb is ‘provides,’ whereby Congress
prescribes specific treatments for specific scenarios of secured claim[s].”104
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the plain meaning—but it interpreted the wrong
language.
The Fifth Circuit’s error significantly impacted its reading of the statute.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed a reading of the statute with three “specific
treatments for specific scenarios”105 because it read the statute as nonexclusive.106 However, whereas “includes” would suggest that the three
alternatives are non-exclusive, “provides” is not defined in the rules of
construction in § 102. Instead, “provides” may suggest that the three provisions
specifically delineated are the only means of satisfying the “fair and equitable”
requirement for secured creditors. For example, the word “provided” was
99

In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
11 U.S.C. § 102(3).
101 In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.
102 Id. at 245–46 (“As alternatives, these provisions are not even exhaustive. The introduction to
§ 1129(b)(2) states that the ‘condition that a plan be fair and equitable includes the following
requirements. . . .’ . . . The Bankruptcy Code specifies that the term ‘includes’ ‘is not limiting.’ 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(3). Even a plan compliant with these alternative minimum standards is not necessarily fair and equitable.
The non-exhaustive nature of the three subsections is inconsistent with treating them as compartmentalized
alternatives.” (internal citations omitted)).
103 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
104 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 325 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
105 See id.
106 See In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245–46.
100
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interpreted to set up three specific, exclusive alternatives in § 1325(a)(5).107 A
similar interpretation of “provides” in § 1129(b)(2)(A) suggests three exclusive
prongs that cannot be substituted by alternatives not delineated in the statute.
Because the alternatives can be reasonably interpreted as exclusive, the
Fifth Circuit’s unsupported claim that “[t]he non-exhaustive nature of the three
subsections is inconsistent with treating them as compartmentalized
alternatives” crumbles on its face.108 The plain meaning can reasonably allow
treating the three subsections as alternatives “prescrib[ing] specific treatments
for specific scenarios.” This creates a plain meaning interpretation different
from the reading expounded by the majorities. The Third and Fifth Circuits
erred by ignoring this alternate plain meaning interpretation and hastily
concluding that the statute was unambiguous.
iii. Overlooking “Requirements”
Though the majorities in Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers
assumed that “includes” is the controlling language,109 they neglected to
interpret the text following “includes.” Once again, the majorities only
selectively applied the plain meaning theory to the statute, causing them to
improperly conclude that the statute unambiguously provided three nonexclusive alternatives. Section 1129(b)(2) states, “[T]he condition that a plan
be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the following
requirements . . . .”110 The word “requirements” implies that the three
treatments are not three “examples,” as the majority suggests, but instead
“specific requirements to be applied to distinct scenarios.”111
By definition, a requirement is not optional. Interpreting the provisions as
“requirements” suggests that each provision entails a specific set of
circumstances that require a specific treatment to permit cramdown.112 The
Third and Fifth Circuits declined to apply the plain meaning theory to interpret

107

In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245–46.
109 See discussion supra Part D.1.b.ii.
110 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
111 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325 n.9 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
112 Brubaker, supra note 21, at 7 (“Use of the word ‘requirement,’ therefore, invokes the ‘necessity’ of an
‘essential requisite’ (see dictionary on your desk) with which the plan cannot dispense. Yes, the statute
delineates three disjunctive means of satisfying this ‘requirement,’ but use of the disjunctive does not resolve
the question of which of these disjunctive means specifies the ‘requirement’ in any particular case.”).
108
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the provisions as “requirements,” instead considering the clauses as mere
examples. Judge Ambro argued a different conclusion:
The words “free and clear of such liens” in the clause modify the
noun “sale” and lead me to believe that clause (ii) is not merely an
example, but an entire category of sales that is prescribed a specific
treatment. Treating “sale . . . free and clear of such liens” as an
example as opposed to a prescription may explain why my colleagues
decline to apply the canons of statutory interpretation I apply
113
below.

Under this interpretation, any sale that attempts to sell collateral free and clear
of secured creditors’ liens would be required to meet the specific treatment
delineated in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), instead of §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) or (iii).
Furthermore, this interpretation holds that “the requirement that a plan is fair
and equitable ‘includes’ several factors,” some of which are specifically
delineated in the statute, and are always “necessary, but not always sufficient,
to satisfy the fair and equitable test.”114 Thus, while the requirements are
“intentionally open ended,” the provisions specified as fair and equitable
treatments are not open ended.115
Meanwhile, the interpretation put forth by the majorities suggests that the
three provisions are “open ended alternatives” to satisfy the fair and equitable
requirement.116 Thus, there are two reasonable plain meaning constructions of
the statute, and canons of statutory interpretation and legislative history must
be used to clarify which construction was intended by Congress.
c. Considering the Policy of Some, but Not All, of the Statute
The majority in Philadelphia Newspapers attempted to justify its narrow
reading of the statute by considering the policy underlying the fair and

113

In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325 n.11 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 142, 154 n.134 (1979).
115 Id. at 142 n.72 (“The Code contains a rule of construction that ‘includes’ is not limiting. 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(3). This implies that the use of the term ‘includes’ is intentionally open ended.”).
116 See, e.g., 6 NORTON, supra note 57, § 113:11, at 113-9 n.6 (“Code § 1129(b)(2) states that the
requirement that a plan be fair and equitable ‘includes’ several alternatives. Under Code § 102(3), the phrase
‘includes’ is construed to mean not limiting. Therefore, it would appear that while Congress has fashioned
several requirements for fair and equitable treatment under Code § 1129(b)(2), those requirements constitute
open ended alternatives as well.”). But see Kenneth N. Klee, supra note 114, at 154 n.134 (“The requirements
of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) are necessary, but not always sufficient, to satisfy the fair and equitable
requirement.”).
114
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equitable requirement in § 1129(b)(1).117 The majority opined that the three
alternatives delineated in § 1129(b)(2)(A) were simply “examples” to “guide
courts in interpreting [the fair and equitable] standard.”118 The Third Circuit
noted that the indubitable equivalent “option” delineated in subsection
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) “invites debtors ‘to craft an appropriate treatment of a
secured creditor’s claim, separate and apart from the provisions of subsection
(ii).’”119 In recognizing this invitation to debtors when cramming down a
creditor, the Third Circuit concluded, “[w]e have no statutory basis for
concluding that such flexibility, consistent with both the language and purpose
of the Code, should be curtailed.”120
However, § 1129 functions as the very mechanism that curtails the debtor’s
“flexibility” to cram down a plan against its creditors. Although
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) lists three ways a debtor may satisfy the fair and equitable
requirement, this section cannot be read in isolation from the cramdown
requirements’ purpose, which is to elevate lenders’ rights over the nonconsensual components of a debtor’s plan.121
The majorities selectively analyzed language and policy, consequently
ignoring another reasonable interpretation. Because there can be two
reasonably interpreted plain meanings of § 1129(b)(2)(A), the court should
have looked to other methods of statutory construction in addition to the plain
meaning analysis.
2. Supplementing the Plain Meaning Axiom with Other Canons of Statutory
Construction
Often, identifying one single plain meaning of a piece of legislation is a
futile effort. After analyzing statutory interpretation trends in recent
bankruptcy decisions, the Honorable Thomas F. Waldron noted the challenge:
Judges should consider the operative language, the language of other
provisions, and structural cues in the statute. But then it is equally
appropriate to pan back from the statute itself to its context, including
legislative history, prior law and practice, and policy considerations,

117
118
119
120
121

In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 309–10.
Id.
Id. at 310 (quoting In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 568 (E.D. Pa. 2009)).
Id.
See infra Part D.2.c.
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to make an interpretation of the intended meaning. Otherwise, courts
122
are likely to err and to bring on unintended consequences.

The Supreme Court also directed,
[T]he plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a
rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive
evidence if it exists.” The circumstances of the enactment of
particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not
123
intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.

Therefore, as presented by the Supreme Court, the plain meaning rule is simply
a starting point. Other persuasive evidence exists suggesting a different
interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A), and this evidence should not be precluded
from consideration. Canons of statutory construction are instructive and
suggest that the dissent’s interpretation may be more appropriate than the
majorities’ narrow interpretation. Besides the plain meaning rule, there are
several other canons of statutory construction that aid in resolving the meaning
intended by Congress. The Supreme Court employs many canons of
interpretation,124 but three are particularly useful to determine the
congressional intent of § 1129(b)(2)(A): legislative history, avoiding
surplusage, and unforeseen consequences. These canons of statutory
construction expose which of the two plausible readings of § 1129 should be
applied.
a. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 suggests that
the majorities erred in concluding that § 1129(b)(2)(A) offers three disjunctive
alternatives to a cramdown and permits a sale of a secured creditor’s collateral

122 Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial
Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 213 (2007), quoting Jean Braucher, The
Challenge To The Bench And Bar Presented By The 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 99 (2007).
123 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting Boston Sand Co. v. United
States, 271 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)).
124 Waldron & Berman, supra note 122, at 212–13 (“If the text of the congressional legislation is
ambiguous rather than being subject to plain meaning, the Supreme Court has employed a variety of principles
to assist in determining congressional intent. These include, without priority or limitation, the following
canons of interpretation: avoiding surplusage, practice under the prior version of the statute, neologisms,
comparison with other sections, unforeseen consequences, expressio unius est exclusio alterius and legislative
history. These principles are frequently used in combination to assist in determining congressional intent.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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without allowing the creditor to credit bid.125 The Supreme Court has
instructed that “we look first to the statutory language and then to the
legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.”126 The Supreme Court
has also directed “that it is always appropriate to consult legislative history to
interpret a statute however clear the words of the statute may appear.”127
Despite clear instruction to consider Congressional intent, the majorities in
Philadelphia Newspapers and Pacific Lumber failed to address the legislative
history evincing Congress’s intent to protect secured creditors’ right to credit
bid.128
Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, secured creditors
were not given special protections unavailable to unsecured creditors.129 In
fact, the Bankruptcy Code did not even provide a test for secured claims.130
125 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit has also long held that legislative intent shows
Congress did not intend the other two provisions of § 1129(b)(2)(A) to be used to sidestep the credit bidding
requirement in clause (ii). John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cal. Hancock, Inc. (In re Cal. Hancock, Inc.), 88
B.R. 226, 231 (B.A.P. 9th. Cir. 1988). The Panel rejected a debtor’s plan when it attempted to use
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) to circumvent the creditor’s right to credit bid at the sale of its collateral. Id. The Panel
held, “Given the Congressional intent to allow a nonrecourse creditor the right to credit bid in a proposed
‘sale’ of the property pursuant to a plan of reorganization, the bankruptcy court properly determined that the
debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization could not be confirmed.” Id. Thus, the Panel “affirm[ed a] secured
creditor’s right to credit-bid regardless of which subsection of § 1129(b)(2)(A) [the] debtor seeks to invoke.”
Markell, supra note 65, at 124 n.315 (citing In re Cal. Hancock, 88 B.R. at 230–31).
126 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984), cited in In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 335
(3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
127 Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 957 n.141
(1979) (citing Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976).
128 William P. Weintraub et al., Third Circuit Bids Credit Bidding Adieu, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 265, 278 (2010) (“The majority decision fails to adequately address, however, the schism between a
literal interpretation of [§] 1129(b)(2)(A) and legislative intent. The practical result of [the] majority’s
decision . . . is hard to reconcile with what seems to be a clear indication that the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code intended to prevent debtors from stripping secured creditor’s liens without providing them with a right to
credit bid. It is simply unlikely that Congress intended this distinction.”). Interestingly, the majority in
Philadelphia Newspapers referenced statutory notes and legislative history to defend its interpretation of “or”
even though § 102(3) is not ambiguous. See supra note 89; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 315 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6272; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5814). The majority in Philadelphia Newspapers rejected the use of most other legislative history in
interpreting the statute. The majority’s use of statutory history and notes to defend its reading of “or,” instead
of simply applying its plain meaning, is one of the many inconsistencies that appear in the majority’s
argument.
129 Under the old law, secured creditors were only required to receive “adequate protection.” “Under
present law a plan may be confirmed over the dissent of a secured creditor as long as the creditor is given
‘adequate protection,’ which includes an appraisal of the collateral and payment in cash of the appraised
amount.” Klee, supra note 114, at 143 n.83.
130 See id. at 143 (“[T]he test for secured claims is completely novel, affording protection for classes of
secured claims that is not provided under present law.”).
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However, legislative history demonstrates that when Congress revised the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the purpose of § 1129(b)(2)(A) was to afford
secured creditors separate protections from unsecured creditors.131
i. Floor Statements in the Congressional Record
The floor statements of Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini are
the most instructive resource on the legislative intent of the revisions.132
Representative Edwards was one of the principal draftsmen and supporters of
the new Bankruptcy Code, and he served as its floor manager in the House of
Representatives.”133 Representative Edwards spent years envisioning, drafting,
and revising the new law.”134 Representative Edwards was assisted by Senator
Dennis DeConcini.135 Most cases interpreting § 1129(b)(2)(A) have referred to
Representative Edwards’s statements, and Collier on Bankruptcy has also
interpreted this section with his floor statements.136
Even Representative Edwards suggested that § 1129(b)(2)(A) did not have
a single plain meaning because he found it necessary to explain some of its
provisions. In his floor statement, Representative Edwards referred to
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) as “self explanatory.”137 This suggests that clause (ii),
when examined in isolation from clauses (i) and (iii), did indeed have a single
plain meaning interpretation. Differently, Representative Edwards implied that
clause (iii) was not self-explanatory by delineating several examples of what
would constitute the “indubitable equivalent” and what would not.138 Thus,
131 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (“Congress intended ‘significant
changes from current law in . . . the treatment of secured creditors and secured claims.’” (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 180 (1977))).
132 “Because of the absence of a conference and the key roles played by Representative Edwards and his
counterpart floor manager Senator DeConcini, we have treated their floor statements on the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 as persuasive evidence of congressional intent.” Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5
(1990). Note that Senator DeConcini gave identical remarks before the Senate floor to Representative
Edwards’ floor statements delivered before the House. Compare 124 CONG. REC. 32,392–418 (1978) (remarks
of Rep. Don Edwards), with 124 CONG. REC. 33,992-4,018 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). These
floor statements are considered the best sources of legislative history on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
Klee, supra note 127, at 957 (directing interpreters of the legislative history to begin with the most recent floor
statements of Congressman Edwards and Senator DeConcini).
133 Klee, supra note 127, at 941 n.6.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04.
137 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards ) (“Clause (ii) is self explanatory.”).
138 Id. (“Abandonment of the collateral to the creditor would clearly satisfy indubitable equivalence, as
would a lien on similar collateral. However, present cash payments less than the secured claim would not
satisfy the standard because the creditor is deprived of an opportunity to gain from a future increase in value of
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even to its draftsman the provision is not self-explanatory. Moreover, of the
examples of indubitable equivalence listed, none of them contemplate a sale,139
suggesting that Congress did not intend clause (iii) to cover sales.
Representative Edwards suggested that all sales of property under a
debtor’s plan must grant secured creditors the right to credit bid.
Representative Edwards noted that “[s]ale of property under [§] 363 or under
the plan is excluded from treatment under [§] 1111(b) because of the secured
party’s right to bid in the full amount of his allowed claim at any sale of
collateral under [§] 363(k) of the House amendment.”140 The majority in
Philadelphia Newspapers dismissed this persuasive legislative history, arguing
that there were instances in which a secured creditor did not have a right to
credit bid on its collateral, citing the “for cause” exception in § 363(k).141
Thus, the majority reasoned, “Given that this legislative history ignores these
vital functions [such as the ‘for cause’ exception] of the Code, we cannot credit
it over the plain language of the statute to confer an absolute right to credit bid
on all asset sales under § 1129(b)(2)(A).”142 In other words, the majority
assumed that because the legislative history did not mention an express
exception to the right to credit bid, the legislative history was an entirely
unreliable source on the right to credit bid. However, as the language of the
statute has already been shown to be ambiguous, Representative Edwards’s
statement is both relevant and persuasive in arguing that secured creditors have
a significant right to credit bid at the sale of their collateral.
Although the plain meaning rule might be effective for interpreting other
sections, Representative Edwards implied that some congressional intent was
stylistically left out of the plain language of the statute. In his floor statement,
he specifically noted that some creditor rights that were “fundamental” to the
“fair and equitable” requirement were purposefully omitted from the statute for
ease of reading.143 Thus, § 1129(b) should be read expansively to broadly

the collateral. Unsecured notes as to the secured claim or equity securities of the debtor would not be the
indubitable equivalent.”)
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
142 Id.
143 124 CONG. REC. 32,407, 34,006 (1978) (“Although many of the factors interpreting ‘fair and
equitable’ are specified in paragraph (2), others . . . were omitted from the House amendment to avoid
statutory complexity and because they would undoubtedly be found by a court to be fundamental to ‘fair and
equitable’ treatment of a dissenting class . . . . [T]he deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of
substance.”).
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protect creditors’ right to fair and equitable treatment, including jealous
protection of creditors’ rights to credit bid.
ii. Principles from a Principal Draftsman
Kenneth Klee, who served as the associate counsel to the House Judiciary
Committee and a principal draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
provides additional support for the proposition that Congress intended a
cramdown sale of collateral to only occur under subsection 1129(b)(2)(ii), in
his article, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code. Although the article cannot wholly substitute for the telling
evidence in the Senate and House Reports, the article captures much similar
legislative intent, as Klee was a principal drafter of the 1978 Amendments.144
Klee warned that “[t]he ‘cram-down’ standards appear to be simple, but the
appearance is deceiving.”145 Then, he identified exactly which clause must be
used in the cramdown sale of collateral free and clear of a lien: “Under 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) the lien must be retained whether the collateral is
retained by the debtor or a successor to the debtor or is sold subject to the lien.
If the collateral is sold free and clear of the lien, then 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is the controlling provision.”146
Klee also directed that sales of a creditor’s collateral can only be crammed
down if the creditor has an opportunity to credit bid: “A sale of collateral must
be made under 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) which permits the lien holders to bid for the
collateral and to offset their allowed claims that are secured by the collateral
against the purchase price.”147 The right to offset a claim against the purchase
price eventually became known as the right to “credit bid.” Klee reiterated,
“[T]he plan may propose to sell collateral free and clear of the lien held by
members of the dissenting class as long as the class has a chance to bid in their
claims and the lien attaches to the proceeds.”148
Klee clarified that the sale of a secured creditor’s collateral affects the
valuation of an undersecured creditor’s claim through the mechanism of credit
bidding. Typically, “as a general rule in a reorganization case, both a recourse
and a nonrecourse lender will have an allowed unsecured claim to the extent

144
145
146
147
148

Klee, supra note 114, 133 n.**.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 155 n.136 (emphasis added).
Id. at 155 n.143 (emphasis added) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
Klee, supra note 114, at 155.
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the value of the collateral is less than the allowed claim.”149 However, Klee
mentioned that the sale of collateral is an exception to this general rule: “[I]f
the collateral securing the loan is sold[,] . . . the nonrecourse lender will have a
chance at the sale to bid in the total amount of his claim against the purchase
price.”150 To support his conclusion, he cited “§§ 363(k) &
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii),”151 suggesting that he only intended for collateral to be sold
under clause (ii)’s specific sales provision, instead of clause (iii)’s “indubitable
equivalence” provision.
To clarify what he considered to be complex situations that arise in a
cramdown, Klee examined fourteen hypothetical examples of creditors who
are crammed down under § 1129(b).152 He suggested, “In the event a court is
required to apply the cramdown test, the above examples may be of
assistance.”153 However, none of the fourteen examples illustrate a sale of a
secured creditor’s collateral pursuant to clause § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)’s
“indubitable equivalent” provision.154 The only sales of a secured creditor’s
collateral illustrated in the examples is made pursuant to §§ 363(k) and
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which would permit the creditor the right to credit bid. This
suggests that § 1129(b)(2)(A) was not designed with the intent to allow
sidestepping of the creditor’s right to credit bid at the sale of its collateral.
b. Avoiding Surplusage
By allowing § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) to override § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), the
majorities improperly elevate a general provision over a specific provision and
render § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) mere surplusage. Two canons of statutory
interpretation suggest that a generalized provision cannot be used to override
specific requirements in the same subsection. It would have been superfluous
of Congress to create a specific clause, followed by a general clause that could
sidestep the specific clause.155 As the Supreme Court stated in D. Ginsberg &
149

Id. at 161.
Id.
151 Id. at 161 n.173.
152 Id. at 171.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 146–71.
155 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 329 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“It seems
Pickwickian to believe that Congress would expend the ink and energy detailing procedures in clause (ii) that
specifically deal with plan sales of property free of liens, only to leave general language in clause (iii) that
could sidestep entirely those very procedures. Unlike the majority, I do not read the language to signal such a
result; I read the text to show congressional intent to limit clause (iii) to those situations not already addressed
in prior, specifically worded clauses.”)
150
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Sons, Inc. v. Popkin long before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was
passed, “Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute
which otherwise might be controlling.”156 The Supreme Court also noted,
“However inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it will not be
held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same
enactment.”157 Additionally, a provision should not be read in a way that
makes another, more specific provision a “practical nullity.”158 The Supreme
Court has instructed, “[A] statute should be interpreted so as not to render one
part inoperative.”159
Congress designed § 1129(b)(2)(A) to delineate two specific provisions and
one residual catch-all to satisfy the fair and equitable requirement for crammed
down secured creditors. Clause (ii) specifically applies when a debtor proposes
to cram down a sale free and clear of a secured creditor’s liens. Meanwhile,
clause (iii) applies broadly to any cramdown transaction in which a secured
creditor receives the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.
By design, Congress implicitly excluded the “indubitable equivalence”
option in transactions in which the secured creditor’s collateral is sold free and
clear of liens. Clause (iii) should not be interpreted in a way that makes the
clause (ii) a “practical nullity.” Therefore, § 1129(b)(2)(A) should be
interpreted to require any cramdown plan that proposes a sale free and clear of
liens to meet the requirements specified in clause (ii), including the secured
creditor’s right to credit bid.
Some may argue that clause (iii), the indubitable equivalent standard, is
itself a specific clause. However, clause (iii) does not include specific
provisions pertaining to the sale of collateral free and clear of liens. Even if it
is a specific clause, it is not applicable to sales of collateral. Clause (ii) is more
specific than clause (iii) in governing sales of collateral free and clear of liens.
As the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York reasoned in In
re Kent Terminal, “As a rule of statutory construction, courts observe that
where two provisions apply, the more specific governs. Certainly,

156

D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932).
Fourco Glass Co., v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957).
158 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 375 (1988).
159 Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); see also TRW, Inc.
v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought,
upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (U.S. 2001))).
157
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§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is more specific than clause (i) if property is sold free and
clear of liens under a plan.”160
c. Unforeseen Consequences
Economic policy also supports an interpretation of § 1129 guaranteeing
secured creditors the right to credit bid. Congress rightfully had an interest in
protecting secured creditors’ rights when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. Congress sought to encourage secured lending because “secured
credit lowers the costs of lending transactions not only by increasing the
strength of the lender’s legal right to force the borrower to pay, but also . . . by
limiting the borrower’s ability to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood
of repayment.”161 One of the protections the act granted to secured creditors
was the right to credit bid on their collateral sold pursuant to a sale free and
clear of liens, conducted under § 1129(b)(2)(A).162 By granting secured
creditors the right to credit bid on the sale of its collateral, Congress implied
that this right was “necessary to ensure proper valuation of the collateral at a
sale free of liens.”163 This right is based upon the secured creditor’s right to
receive the full amount of their claim.164
Policy also supports the interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) as the only
cramdown mechanism for debtors to conduct a sale of a creditor’s collateral.
Debtors may have a motivation to deny credit bidding165 and will only seek
confirmation of a plan under clause (ii) if offering credit bidding rights is
advantageous to them. However, such a plan directly contradicts the statutory
intent of §§ 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A) to strengthen protections for secured
creditors. Although “most courts jealously protect the secured creditor’s right
to credit bid, and will deny confirmation if that right is significantly
impaired,”166 Congress intended to strengthen the protections for secured
160

In re Kent Terminal Corp., 166 B.R. 555, 565 n.15 (1994).
Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 683 (1997), cited
in In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 337 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006).
163 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 337 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
164 See Brubaker, supra note 21, at 13 (discussing a secured creditor’s right to a lien on the proceeds from
a sale of its collateral).
165 For examples of possible debtor motivations to deny credit bidding, specifically for nonrecourse
creditors, see Rubinger & Marsh, supra note 70, at 266 (“Perhaps the debtor’s motivation in doing so is to
effectuate a sale to a related entity at a bargain price. Or, the debtor’s motivation could be to conduct a sale
which yields actual cash to be used in funding its plan. A credit bid is not nearly as attractive to the debtor
since it is essentially a set-off of the secured creditor’s claim and does not yield any cash.”).
166 7 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 1129.04[2][b][ii].
161
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creditors via statute, instead of leaving creditor rights to judicial discretion.
The indubitable equivalent provision in clause (iii), if not narrowly interpreted
by the courts, might “provide carte blanche to creative debtors,” which
conflicts with the purpose of § 1129(b)(2)(A) to protect secured creditors.167
The policy implications of the confirmation process itself also urge reading
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) as the only mechanism for debtors to cram down a sale of a
creditor’s collateral. The negotiations that occur during the confirmation
process are shaped by the bargaining power granted to creditors by the debtor’s
burdensome cramdown requirements in § 1129. The significant fair and
equitable requirements in § 1129 are evidence that Congress sought to
encourage negotiation between debtors and creditors. As Klee noted, “The
complexity of cram down should encourage the debtor to bargain with
creditors to gain acceptance of a plan in a majority of cases.”168 The majorities’
decisions greatly ease these requirements for the debtor, weakening creditors’
bargaining power in negotiations. If secured creditors are not entitled to credit
bid, they can lose their leverage throughout the confirmation process, even
before a cramdown is proposed. One commentator suggested, “[A] secured
creditor may not be entitled to the proverbial ‘seat at the table’ in any plan
negotiations where the plan involves a disposition of the secured creditor’s
collateral.”169 This will have its greatest effect on secured creditors with a large
undersecured claim that once had “substantial leverage” in such
negotiations.170 Now, during plan negotiations, plan proponents have the
leverage that comes with being able to threaten to cram down a plan denying
credit bid rights. Secured creditors may become more likely to agree to a
chapter 11 plan with less favorable terms, and lenders may concede other terms
in negotiation.
Additionally, the right to credit bid is integral to the current sales process
between debtors and creditors. Within the lending industry, debtors and
creditors have settled expectations on negotiating debt instruments. Any
change in the interpretation of the absolute right to credit bid may lead to
higher lending costs as secured creditors will price more risk into lending
decisions. The ultimate cost of habitually denying secured lenders the
167

Alfred S. Lury & Brett J. Berlin, When Can Less than All of a Creditor’s Collateral Serve as the
Indubitable Equivalent of the Creditor’s Secured Claim?, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 333, 340 (1997–98).
168 Klee, supra note 114, at 171.
169 Daniel Guyder & Daniel Morse, Extinguishing a Secured Creditor’s Right to Credit Bid in a Chapter
11 Cram Down, 2010 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 65, 65.
170 Id. at 70.
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opportunity to credit bid will trickle down to debtors. Consequently, denying
secured lenders’ right to credit bid at an auction of its collateral may reduce
overall availability of lending to debtors. This may also increase the cost of
corporate reorganizations, as secured creditors will become more hostile to a
§ 1129 cramdown and litigate heavily to protect their rights.
The difficulty of discerning a statute’s single plain meaning urges
consideration of legislative history and canons of statutory interpretation. In
addition, the policy implications of loosely interpreting the statute illustrate
why Congress intended strict requirements on the free and clear sale of a
secured creditor’s collateral, including the requirement that the creditor be
permitted to credit bid at the sale. All courts should recognize this right to
credit bid in a cramdown sale.
E. Picking up the Paper: How Creditors Can Protect Their Rights to The Full
Value of Their Collateral
Creditors must be proactive to counter the frightening “trend toward
judicial disregard for the bankruptcy processes that protect priority.”171 This
section analyzes preemptive strategies creditors can implement to best protect
their rights to collateral and mitigate the blow from the Philadelphia
Newspapers and Pacific Lumber decisions. Lenders in jurisdictions that
already have denied an absolute right to credit bid, as well as lenders in
jurisdictions that might follow suit, should implement these strategies.
The best and most obvious strategies are those that require secured
creditors to put forth additional resources to protect their collateral. These
include offering debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing,172 aggressively
litigating during the confirmation hearing process,173 and, if unsuccessful,
submitting cash bids during the auction sale.174 While they are likely to be the
most successful, these strategies will not be available to most creditors because
of their high cost.
The earlier a secured creditor attempts to protect its right to receive the full
value of its collateral, the less costly the attempt will be. Thus, as a less
expensive alternative to the methods mentioned above, secured creditors
171 Barry E. Adler, Does Reorganization Need Reform?: A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization
After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 318 n.18 (2010).
172 See discussion infra Part E.3.a.
173 See discussion infra Part E.4.
174 See discussion infra Part E.5.
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should implement preventative tactics earlier in the lending cycle to more
affordably reduce the risk that they will receive less than the full value of their
collateral.
1. Investment Strategies
Creditors must act more conservatively from the commencement of the
lending cycle. Of course, creditors should avoid questionable investments.
Meanwhile, for investments that they do undertake, lenders must carefully
draft loan agreement documents that guarantee their ability to credit bid.175
Additionally, lenders must price the new risk of being denied the opportunity
to credit bid. In exchange for bearing this costly risk, creditors should consider
raising lending costs.176 By avoiding high-risk investments, carefully drafting
loan agreements, and pricing the cost of bearing the new risk into their lending
rates, creditors will be able to start the lending cycle with a more predictable
outlook.
2. Prepetition Strategies
A secured creditor must continually assess the financial health of its
debtors. Upon observing that its debtor is nearing financial distress, a creditor
should initiate or threaten to initiate a foreclosure action in state court, instead
of waiting for its debtor to file bankruptcy.177

175 Brett H. Miller et al., Lenders Beware: The 3rd Circuit Has Other Ideas about Credit Bidding, 15
WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER LIABILITY, Apr. 26, 2010, at 1, 6 (“Before this decision came down, a lender
negotiated a loan agreement knowing that it would have the right to credit bid its claim in a plan sale, thereby
ensuring that either its claim is fully covered by the final purchase price or the lender would be able to take
back the property from the debtor.”); Weintraub et al., supra note 128, at 278.
176 See Eric W. Anderson & Joshua J. Lewis, The Philadelphia Story: Third Circuit Denies Lenders’
Credit-Bid Rights, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2010, at 14, 63; see also Carolyn P. Richter & Sabrina G. Fitze,
Philadelphia Newspapers’ Credit Bid Decision—How Does Losing the Absolute Right to Credit Bid in a Sale
Under a Plan of Reorganization Impact Lenders and Borrowers?, 2010 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 274, 280 (“If
secured creditors can no longer absolutely rely on their ability to credit bid in extending credit to debtors, will
this risk be passed on by lenders in the form of increased interest rates and reduction in credit availability?”).
177 Daniel Morman & Kenneth A. Welt, Foreclosure Sales Should Be Allowed in Court, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Jul.–Aug. 2010, at 46, 46. Although “[i]t is readily accepted that sales of properties under § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code in bankruptcy court generate higher prices than those in foreclosure sales under state court
procedure,” the higher prices are presumably a result of the requirement in § 363(k) that creditors have the
right to credit bid at a § 363 sale in bankruptcy court. Id. Therefore, creditors fearing a denial of credit bidding
rights under a cramdown plan should initiate a foreclosure sale in bankruptcy court, despite the reality that it
will likely generate a lower price than a sale before the bankruptcy court.
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Prepetition workout agreements between debtors and creditors are
particularly useful for secured creditors fearing a denial of credit bidding
rights. In any prepetition workout agreement, a creditor should seek an
agreement with the debtor “not to contest relief from the stay in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding.”178 If this agreement is later enforced by a bankruptcy
court, then creditors will have the opportunity to prevent a cramdown sale by
seeking relief from the stay and initiating a § 363 sale, which will guarantee a
credit bidding opportunity.179 With this goal in mind, creditors must negotiate
carefully. Debtors in the Third and Fifth Circuits may attempt to leverage their
positions by threatening to pursue a cramdown sale denying credit bidding
rights.180
Additionally, if a debtor appears likely to file bankruptcy, creditors should
pressure the debtor to file outside of the Third and Fifth Circuits, where
creditors may still have an absolute right to credit bid.181
3. Strategies During Plan Creation
After the debtor files a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, a secured lender
should consider three strategies: (1) providing DIP financing, (2) seeking a lift
of the automatic stay, and (3) swapping its debt for equity.
a. Debtor-in-Possession Financing
Upon filing chapter 11 bankruptcy, debtors will require postbankruptcy
financing to continue operations and to implement a restructuring plan.
Secured creditors should pursue an opportunity to offer postpetition DIP
financing. Such an agreement will improve the creditor’s leverage over the
debtor,182 and the creditor can seek to extract concessions from the debtor.183
178

JAMES M. LAWNICZAK, 2 ASSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 16.10[2] (2011).
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006).
180 But see In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (restructuring negotiations
with secured creditors and other prepetition lenders failed), aff’d, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010).
181 Weintraub et al., supra note 128, at 278.
182 See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 74 (2004) (“DIP lenders
and their counsel have taken the sparse authorizing language of Bankruptcy Code § 364 and used it to perfect a
transaction that garners them high fees, good return on investment, substantial control over the debtor’s
management and operations, and enhanced prospects for repayment of their prepetition debt.”).
183 Weintraub et al., supra note 128, at 279 (“Although the full import of the Philadelphia Newspapers
decision cannot yet be determined, recent news reports indicate that secured lenders are already trying to
extract concessions in DIP financing agreements to neutralize the plan strategy used by the Debtors in
Philadelphia Newspapers.”).
179
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However, postpetition DIP financing is only a feasible solution for large-scale
lenders that have the capacity to extend additional credit. Moreover, DIP
financing is only recommended if the creditor predicts a successful chapter 11
restructuring. Otherwise, if a creditor lacks confidence in a debtor’s
management, then it should hesitate to protect its collateral with DIP financing.
Optimally, a creditor should extract three concessions from the debtor in
exchange for offering postpetition financing. These concessions will be
incorporated directly as loan covenants into the new financing agreement.
First, creditors should secure an agreement ensuring that, in exchange for
postpetition financing, the creditor can credit bid in all circumstances where
the collateral is to be sold.184 Such a provision would require a debtor to waive
its objection to the creditor’s opportunity to credit bid. However, pursuing
agreements with such a provision may be risky, as such agreements might not
be enforceable if courts refuse to approve them.185 While “[c]ourts generally
allow a debtor in possession that obtains postpetition financing from a
prepetition lender to waive, as part of the financing arrangement, any
objections to the validity, priority, and amount of the lender’s prepetition
security interest,”186 a debtor’s waiver to challenge credit bidding might be
more controversial.

184 Anderson & Lewis, supra note 176, at 63; Richter & Fitze, supra note 176, at 280; see also Kuney,
supra note 182, at 64 (“Bankruptcy courts have allowed chapter 11 debtors to waive their rights against
lenders for providing DIP financing. As consideration for DIP financing, debtors may, for example, waive the
right to object to the validity, priority, and amount of the lender’s prepetition claims. These waivers are
routinely included in the DIP loan documents to provide an incentive to loan.”); Weintraub et al., supra note
128, at 279. (“The concessions presumably take the form of an agreement that the secured lenders can credit
bid in all circumstances where their collateral is to be sold.”); Paul H. Zumbro & Robert H. Trust, Paul H.
Zumbro and Robert H. Trust on In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 2010 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES
ANALYSIS 4956, at 4 (2010) (“[T]hey may, if they are providing debtor-in-possession financing or consenting
to use of cash collateral, attempt to negotiate limits on the kind of plan the debtor may file.”).
185 Anderson & Lewis, supra note 176, at 63 (“Of course, courts may not approve any DIP order or cash
collateral order restricting a debtor’s ability to file and confirm a plan, but it seems reasonable for a DIP lender
to insist that submission of a plan proposing to deny credit-bidding would constitute a default under the DIP
facility or cash collateral order.”); Weintraub et al., supra note 128, 279 (“The enforceability of these
concessions and the willingness of bankruptcy courts to approve lender incentives . . . remains to be seen.”).
186 PETER ANTOSZYK, TRENDS IN DEBTOR IN POSSESSION FINANCING 1, 8 (2001). If the waiver of the
debtor’s claim is controversial, the lender can argue that “the order was not so much a ‘settlement’ as a term or
condition of the bargain made between the debtor and creditor to encourage the creditor to extend further
postpetition credit.” Id. at 9 (quoting In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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Second, a postpetition financing agreement should also include a provision
requiring a quick asset sale within the debtor’s first 100 days after filing.187
Such a provision would make the DIP loan conditioned on the creditor’s ability
to force an auction under § 363 before the plan process is finalized.188 As
discussed earlier, any sale under § 363 must allow a secured creditor the
opportunity to credit bid on its collateral.189 In addition to guaranteeing the
creditor an opportunity to credit bid, a quick asset sale abridges the debtor’s
opportunity to find a favored buyer to cram down the lenders.190 Of course, as
any transaction outside the course of everyday business, a quick asset sale,
even if provided for in a postpetition financing agreement, will require court
approval.191 Another provision a creditor should include in a DIP financing
agreement is a “drop-dead clause,” enhancing a creditor’s rights in the instance
of a debtor’s default on the DIP financing loan. Essentially, the clause will
create a mechanism for the creditor to lift the automatic stay on its original
collateral. These clauses “provid[e] for a future lifting of the stay and
authoriz[e] the lender to exercise its rights and remedies upon the debtor’s
default under the [DIP] loan documents without the need to gain bankruptcy
approval at the time of a default.”192 The provision should be structured “so
that previously approved recitals and stipulations in the loan documents limit
the issues to be litigated to whether the debtor in fact defaulted under the terms
of the [DIP financing] agreement.”193 Although the debtor’s default on the DIP
financing loan with a “drop-dead clause” will not automatically lift the stay, a
court will only consider whether the debtor defaulted. After the court
determines that the debtor defaulted on its DIP financing loan agreement, then
the court will likely lift the automatic stay on the creditor’s collateral. With the
stay lifted, the creditor will be able to execute a sale under its own terms,
including a right to credit bid.
187 Miller et al., supra note 175, at 6 (“[M]ore lenders might choose to build milestones into debtor in
possession facilities that require asset sales within the first 100 days of the case in order to preserve the
lenders’ [§] 363(k) credit bid rights.”).
188 See Kuney, supra note 182, at 108 (“Often, DIP lenders will condition their loans on a quick
sale. . . . [This action] result[s] in inducing—or even forcing—the debtor to sell all or substantially all of its
assets as a going concern via a fast § 363(f) sale.”).
189 LAWNICZAK, supra note 178, § 16.11[4(d)].
190 Miller et al., supra note 175, at 5; Darryl S. Laddin & Sean C. Kulka, Rulings Shift Leverage Away
from Secured Creditors: The Right to Credit-Bid May Dissolve if a Plan Provides the ‘Indubitable Equivalent’
of the Claim, 32 NAT’L L.J., Feb. 15, 2010.
191 LAWNICZAK, supra note 178, § 16.11[1].
192 Kuney, supra note 182, at 68. To be enforceable the provision should also provide for notice and an
opportunity to be heard before lifting the stay; automatic “drop-dead clauses” are generally not enforceable.
See id. at 68–69.
193 Id. at 69; see also ANTOSZYK, supra note 186, at 9.
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b. Seeking a Lift of the Automatic Stay
Instead of financing the debtor to provide a future opportunity to seek a lift
of the automatic stay, a secured creditor can also immediately petition for a lift
of the automatic stay.194 A lift of the stay will permit the secured creditor to
foreclose on its collateral. A secured creditor should seek to lift the stay if the
debtor is not willing to work with the secured creditor, or vice versa.195 A
creditor should seek relief from the stay shortly after filing for chapter 11
bankruptcy.196 Because courts may initially offer a debtor some leeway,
repeated attempts to seek relief may be necessary until relief is granted.197
In most instances, the court may grant relief from the automatic stay “for
cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest; [or] . . . if—(A) the debtor does not have an equity in
such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization.”198 Thus, a secured creditor must demonstrate “cause.”199 To
show this, a lender should argue that the lender has not received adequate
protection.200 Alternatively, a lender could argue “cause” by demonstrating that
a debtor does not have equity in the lender’s collateral; however, lenders
should be wary of arguing for a low valuation, as they may find themselves
inconsistently seeking a higher valuation later in the case.201
c. Debt-for-Equity Swap
A third option during the planning phase is for secured lenders to seek a
debt-for-equity swap, in which “creditors exchange their debt claims for new
194

Laddin & Kulka, supra note 190.
See LAWNICZAK, supra note 178, § 16.10[1]. Typically, if the creditor and debtor are willing to work
together, it will “obtain bankruptcy court approval of its rights either through debtor-in-possession financing or
a cash collateral order.” Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), (2) (2006). Section 362(d) includes two other grounds for relief from the stay,
but they are limited in scope. The first ground only affects single asset real estate cases. Id. § 362(d)(3). The
other ground, added recently by Congress in its 2005 Act, affects only claims secured by real property in
which the filing “was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.” Id. § 362(d)(4).
199 See id. § 362(d)(1).
200 Id.
201 LAWNICZAK, supra note 178, § 16.10[3][a] (“For example, the creditor may be arguing for a much
higher value if the matter comes up on plan confirmation, where the secured party’s secured claim will be the
value of the property. Even though a court determination of value for one purpose at an earlier time is not
absolutely binding on what the same property is worth for a different purpose at a subsequent time, the court is
still likely to remember what happened at the first hearing.”).
195
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equity securities in the reorganized debtor.”202 With this strategy, a secured
creditor forgives debt in exchange for receiving shares.203 A debt-for-equity
swap entirely eliminates the risks of competitive bidding and provides an
efficient means for a secured lender to acquire the debtor’s business.204
Like a secured creditor who employs credit bidding at an auction sale of its
collateral, a lender exchanging its debt for equity avoids the risk of its
collateral selling for a low price. Debt-for-equity swaps are useful “in these
times of persistently stagnant credit markets” because they prevent sales “at
cyclically low fire sale prices.”205 Furthermore, debt-for-equity swaps are also
regarded as “an effective means by which to effect a reorganization where the
impaired creditors are betting that their collective fortunes will be furthered
over time by overall improving business conditions.”206 However, a secured
creditor should hesitate to seek a debt-for-equity swap when it cannot forecast
improving business conditions or an appreciation in the value of its
collateral.207 Additionally, the debtor-in-possession, or its insiders, may
prevent a debt-for-equity swap from occurring.208
4. Aggressive Litigation of Valuation
If a debtor has proposed a cramdown plan that denies credit bidding rights,
secured creditors should appear during the confirmation hearing to
aggressively protect their rights. The lender should not waive the opportunity
to aggressively litigate the “indubitable equivalent” standard. Whether the
indubitable equivalent standard can ever be met if credit bidding rights are
denied is one obvious unanswered question. Secured creditors must prepare to
litigate this issue: “[U]nlike the secured creditors in Pacific Lumber, a secured
creditor should aggressively challenge the sufficiency of the marketing and
valuation of its collateral, to preserve the argument that the restriction on credit
202 Leonard P. Goldberger, Debt-for-Equity Moves Down the Food Chain, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct
2010, at 30, 30.
203 Id.
204 Id. (“The recent case of Philadelphia Newspapers LLC is a stark object lesson in the perils facing
secured creditors that attempt to acquire control of a reorganizing debtor by bidding in their liens under
§ 363(k).”).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See id.
208 See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Quantum Indus., LDC (In re Outboard Marine), No. 02 C 1594, 2003
WL 21697357, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Debtors use equitable subordination as a mechanism for prevention. This
entails “recharacterizing” the advance of money as equity instead of debt. To show this, the secured creditor
must be shown to have engaged in inequitable conduct.
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bidding failed to generate fair market value at the auction or the indubitable
equivalent of its claim.”209
At a confirmation hearing in which a debtor attempts to proceed under
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), secured lenders should more aggressively dispute the
valuation of the indubitable equivalent.210 As the Fifth Circuit warned,
“Whatever uncertainties exist about indubitable equivalent, paying off secured
creditors in cash can hardly be improper if the plan accurately reflected the
value of the [secured creditors’] collateral.”211 The creditor should oppose the
debtor’s valuation of the collateral. The debtor must show “that the valuation
proposed by the debtor is not market value, and thus only a credit bid will give
it the indubitable equivalent.”212 If the lender can establish that it did not
receive the indubitable equivalent, then the plan cannot later be confirmed
under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).213 Creditors should center their independent
valuation on the “Supreme Court’s 1999 decision casting a jaundiced eye
toward insider plans that attempt to cram[ ]down secured lenders.”214 The
Third Circuit itself even suggested that a secured lender can dispute whether it
receives the indubitable equivalent of its collateral when it is sold with an
“absence of a credit bid.”215 The Seventh Circuit went even further and
reasoned, “[E]ven if we analyze Subsection (iii) of [§] 1129(b)(2)(A) in
isolation, the text of the [indubitable equivalent] provision does not
unambiguously indicate that plans such as those proposed by the Debtors
[denying secured lenders the opportunity to credit bid] qualify for ‘fair and
equitable’ status.”216 Although the confirmation hearing may focus on the
quantitative value of their claim, creditors should argue that they would not
receive the indubitable equivalent, and the proposed sale would not be “fair
and equitable,” because the value of their claim must account for all of the
209

Laddin & Kulka, supra note 190.
See Weintraub et al., supra note 128, at 279.
211 Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 247 (5th Cir. 2009).
212 Richter & Fitze, supra note 176, at 280; see also Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 69
(“[C]reditors should be prepared to provide their own market valuation at the confirmation hearing to bolster
their argument that future appreciation of the collateral will provide better value to the creditors.”).
213 Richter & Fitze, supra note 176, at 280.
214 Zumbro & Trust, supra note 184, at 4.
215 In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A] lender can still object to plan
confirmation on a variety of bases, including that the absence of a credit bid did not provide it with the
‘indubitable equivalent’ of its collateral.”).
216 River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), No. 103597, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *6 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112
(U.S. Aug. 5, 2011) (No. 11-166).
210
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rights available to secured creditors.217 These rights include the right to take
back their collateral and the right to credit bid. Aggressive litigation focusing
on these rights may therefore be able to stop a creditor from facing a
cramdown without its familiar right to credit bid at an auction sale of its
collateral.
5. Cramdown Strategies (After Denial of a Request to Credit Bid)
The best, and perhaps most obvious, solution for secured creditors who
sought to credit bid at the sale of their collateral is to present a cash bid at the
same sale. Secured lenders can potentially follow in the footsteps of the
creditors in Philadelphia Newspapers, who were denied a right to credit bid,
and instead made a cash bid at the auction, up to the value of their claims.218
Cash bidding is a useful mechanism when the lender has been denied the
opportunity to credit bid and the collateral yields an unfair price during the
auction. Cash bidding is the best option because it mirrors the effect of credit
bidding: the creditor can veto a low sales price by bidding up the price.219
Cash bidding requires liquidity. Unlike credit bidders, cash bidders must
front the funds for their bid. Thus, to cash bid, lenders must have access to
enough cash to present at the auction sale. If the lender does not have enough
cash on hand to bid on its collateral, the lender must consider “a mechanism
for funding a cash bid,”220 including a “daylight loan.”221 This option is
“perhaps not as appealing during these difficult financial times,” but may be
especially useful if the “lender believes that its collateral is appreciating.”222 If
the creditor purchases its collateral, it can later resell it for a higher price upon
acquiring the asset.
In light of the economic downturn, presenting a cash bid is unlikely to
occur because of the lack of liquidity in the lending market. Cash bidding is

217 Anderson & Lewis, supra note 176, at 63 (One way to argue that the absence of a credit bid did not
provide the secured lender with the indubitable equivalent is for creditors to “argue that their ‘claim’ consists
of their full bundle of rights against the debtors and their collateral, and, outside of bankruptcy, a critical
component of their claim was the ultimate ability to foreclose upon and take back their collateral. Under this
argument, denial of credit-bidding could not truly be the indubitable equivalent of the lenders’ claim because
the right to credit is a key benefit of the lenders’ prepetition bargain.”).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 23–27.
219 Weintraub et al., supra note 128, at 279.
220 Christenfeld & Goodstein, supra note 69.
221 Zumbro & Trust, supra note 184, at 4.
222 Laddin & Kulkin, supra note 190.
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most realistic in situations where a single financial institution holds the debt.223
This option is less realistic where multiple creditors hold the debt.224 However,
in Philadelphia Newspapers, the creditors, a consortium of financial
institutions, pooled together funds to generate a competitive cash bid that
allowed them to purchase substantially all of the debtors’ assets.225 The
prospects of presenting a cash bid will likely improve with the end of the
economic recession.
These strategies strengthen a secured creditor’s bargaining power to ensure
that it receives the full value of its collateral during a chapter 11 bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
In Philadelphia Newspapers, the secured creditors still managed to prevail
at the auction sale of their collateral, despite being denied the opportunity to
credit bid by the Third Circuit. The creditors’ success came at the cost of
financing expensive litigation and assembling a sizable cash bid. Meanwhile,
in most other circuits, a debtor’s ability to circumvent its secured creditors’
right to credit bid under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) remains unclear.
Courts must recognize that § 1129(b)(2)(A) is ambiguous and allows for
two reasonable constructions. In light of the ambiguity, legislative history and
canons of statutory interpretation should be applied to clarify which
construction Congress intended. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 and the cardinal canons of statutory interpretation urge an
interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) that favors the secured creditors’ right to
credit bid at the free and clear sale of their collateral. If courts hold otherwise,
secured creditors will be forced to take strategic actions to ensure that they
receive the full value of their collateral in a chapter 11 filing. Those strategies

223 Richter & Fitze, supra note 176, at 279 (“In an auction, the impact may be less significant if a single
financial institution with liquid assets holds the debt. Secured creditors that have liquidity can participate in an
auction by bidding and paying cash at closing, trusting that the proceeds will be paid to it as the holder of the
lien.”).
224 Id. (noting that when multiple debtors consider funding a cash bid through additional debt, a
unanimous vote is typically required).
225 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
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will be very costly, including increased lending fees and litigation expenses.
Until the circuit court decisions are overturned, the costly lender responses to
Philadelphia Newspapers and Pacific Lumber will trickle down to all debtors.
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